INTRODUCTION
The global degree of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) concentration in the atmosphere -a direct cause of global warming -has reached worrying record levels, and is continuing to rise along a steep upward trend. Global Carbon Budget (GCB) estimates 1 point out that carbon concentration in the atmosphere increased by 85 parts per million (ppm) from 1959 to 2015, nearly 40 per cent of which was over the last 15 years, and that combustion of fossil fuels is the dominant and growing anthropogenic source of emissions.
GCB figures also point out that stabilizing or, even more, reducing CO 2 concentration would require drastic global emissions abatement, considerably above 50 per cent. Such a great reduction, besides being difficult to attain within a reasonable time horizon, would entail huge costs for developing countries. Indeed, as International Energy Agency (IEA) figures show, 2 non-OECD countries actually emit the greatest share of CO 2 , and the recent emissions' increase was driven by positive and desirable catching-up phenomena, with poorer countries experiencing mortality rate reductions and increases in well-being. Indeed, increases in global population and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita have been the main forces driving upward trends in CO 2 emissions, while global emissions intensity has been progressively decreasing.
For these reasons, most recent guidelines 3 suggest large-scale integrated approaches combining measures to both strengthen efforts to reduce emissions and boost carbon sequestration. Following these guidelines, a proper approach should be, for example, to price carbon and to use revenues to promote protection and development of carbon sink ecosystems. Hence, it becomes particularly important to adopt anti-emissions measures that do not harm the economy and free up resources to strengthen the climate change fight.
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Among market-based instruments, literature indicates that carbon taxes are one of the most cost-effective for emissions reduction. In particular, upstream (or production-based) CO 2 taxation -a tax levied at the point where the source of emissions enters the economic system -is suggested as it has low administrative costs and ensures great coverage. If imposed unilaterally, however, this kind of tax could entail significant economic costs, mainly through competitiveness losses, and could become environmentally ineffective due to carbon leakage phenomena. Suggested co-measures, such as border tax adjustments or proper reuse of revenues, might not be sufficient to avoid these problems and to make a production-based carbon tax an easy win-win solution.
Literature then suggests as a viable alternative a different carbon tax design: namely the CAT (carbon-added tax), a downstream, or consumption-based, carbon tax modelled on value-added tax. It has the advantage of protecting competitiveness of domestic producers as it is levied on imports and reimbursed on exports.
In this chapter, the implementation of a fuel-added carbon tax (FACT) -a duty levied on fossil fuel embodied in goods and services and patterned after VAT-is considered and compared with a tax on fossil fuel purchases (FCT), the simplest and most common upstream carbon tax. In particular, macroeconomic effects of both taxes are estimated for Italy, using MEMo-It, the macroeconometric model of the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly reviews characteristics and implications of production-based carbon taxes. Section 1.3 examines downstream taxation and describes the FACT. Section 1.4 deals with differences between FCT and FACT both from theoretical and empirical points of view. In particular, the effects of their implementation in Italy are analysed and compared. Some conclusions follow in section 1.5. A technical appendix on FACT simulation concludes the chapter.
UPSTREAM TAXATION OF CO 2 EMISSIONS: PRODUCTION-BASED CARBON TAXES
Theoretical literature suggests imposing taxes directly on, or close to, environmental damage and proportional to the specific environmental cost. 4 According to theory, a carbon tax on fossil fuel emissions should fall at different points of the production-consumption chain, where the fuel is burned, and should equal the marginal damage. Considering administrative costs, relative to measurement, management and control, it can, however, become optimal to impose the tax farther from the emissions and set it equal to the average damage. 5 For these reasons, the most common carbon tax takes the form of a duty on fossil fuel purchases. It falls upstream, when fossil fuels enter the system, involves low administrative costs and is effective in the short and long run, inducing economic agents' behavioural changes and technological innovations that lead to structural emissions reduction. It should be noted that, even if imposed upstream, the price signal must reach consumers in order to fully achieve such desired effects. It is widely recognized 6 that the major risk arising from the implementation of a unilateral production-based carbon tax, and the most important obstacle to its implementation, is the competitive disadvantage that can lead to shifting production abroad. This phenomenon, called carbon leakage, undermines the global emission reduction target, by reducing national emissions in the abating country but increasing emissions in non-abating ones, and poses a major challenge for designing effective unilateral policies aimed at mitigating global climate change. Finally, production-based carbon taxes have important, and inequitable, international burden-shifting implications.
Carbon Leakage
Carbon leakage may occur through several channels. First of all, the reduced demand for fossil fuels in the unilaterally abating country causes an international fuel price decrease, which means a demand increase and then an increase of emissions in countries with no or lower carbon pricing. The second channel works in the medium to long term and occurs because energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries in the unilaterally abating country lose competitiveness and their production is relocated to areas where abatement costs are lower. A further channel happens through substitution of domestic products with cheaper imported ones. Finally, the last channel, less considered in literature, affects the economy in the short to medium term and becomes important if the exchange rate is not fully flexible and costs are indexed. It is due to the 'cascading effect' on costs that occurs through both wages indexation and increases in prices of domestically produced inputs. This results in further competitiveness losses and therefore in additional incentives to move production abroad. If entrepreneurs anticipate this development, a stronger carbon leakage effect should happen in the short term. Theoretical and empirical literature widely agree that economic costs from a unilateral carbon tax the main obstacle to environmental taxes implementation. To overcome these limits, several anti-leakage measures have been proposed: border tax adjustment, industry exemption, subsidies and rebates, and reuse of revenues to reduce other more distortive taxes ('double dividend' literature). 7 Anti-leakage proposed measures are, however, second-best instruments that could lead to reduced environmental benefits, provide little or no incentive to cut emissions, and result in protection of sectors with greater emission intensity with respect to the rest of the world. 8 Among instruments aiming to reduce carbon leakage without reducing environmental benefits of a unilateral carbon tax, border tax adjustments (BTAs) are widely regarded as the most effective instruments. They are aimed at levelling the playing field between the national regulated industries and unregulated industries abroad, usually taxing imports to the same extent as domestically produced goods and exempting exports. This solution has, however, some important limits. First of all, a correct implementation of BTAs could be excessively complicated and could have extremely high administrative costs. 9 Second, BTAs do not avoid increased prices of domestically produced inputs and the ensuing negative effects on competitiveness. Finally, compliance of BTAs with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules is highly controversial, as such border adjustments might be considered a barrier to international trade, by discriminating against some imports in favour of domestic products or other imports, or by restricting trade between developed and developing countries.
International Burden-shifting Implications
In a context where about one-quarter of the carbon released is associated with production of internationally traded goods and services, 10 the upstream carbon tax has important implications for international burden distribution. The tax burden, indeed, will weigh differently on countries, according to their production characteristics and their position along the so-called carbon supply chain. 11 Carbon supply chains follow goods' flows according to their embodied carbon, that is, CO 2 emissions that are needed to produce them, from extraction or production of raw materials and intermediate goods, up to final consumption, including transport activities. This approach enables consideration of 'the geographic separation of consumers and the pollution emitted in the production of the consumable items' 12 and shows that within a single country there could be significant differences between 'produced emissions' and 'consumed emissions'.
Countries can indeed be distinguished into three main groups: at one end, countries that are net exporters of fossil fuels; in the middle, countries
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DOWNSTREAM TAXATION: CONSUMPTION-BASED CARBON TAXES
An alternative measure to production-based carbon taxes suggested by the literature is downstream taxation, that is, a tax imposed on final consumption. 16 A consumption-based carbon tax is imposed on carbon embodied in final goods and services and shifts the responsibility from territorial to consumption emissions. Pricing carbon downstream has the advantage of protecting competitiveness of domestic producers and can be more easily implemented. Furthermore, other countries are stimulated to price carbon to retain border tax revenues. 17 Literature suggests the carbon-added tax (CAT), that is, a tax based on carbon embodied in products and modelled on VAT.
The major criticisms of consumption-based carbon taxes are the possible conflict with international trade law and an extremely complicated implementation, as with BTAs. 18 However, a growing body of legal experts agree on compliance of well-designed consumption-based approaches with WTO rules and it can be argued that, as in the case of upstream taxation, second-best solutions can be found to facilitate its implementation and minimize administrative costs. For example, a consumption-based tax on fossil fuels could be much simpler to manage with respect to taxes on carbon content and can be a viable alternative to common taxes on fuel purchases.
Fuel-added Carbon Tax
A fuel-added carbon tax (FACT) is a duty levied on the fuel that is added at each stage. Like VAT, the product is taxed at the end of each stage on its cumulative fuel content to that point, and credit is allowed for tax paid on fuel embodied in purchased inputs and refunded if net liability is negative. At the final stage, the tax is on the cumulative fuel used and is equivalent to the sum of the fuel-added carbon taxes at each stage.
In the case of exports, the tax accumulated will be rebated, so that the tax does not impact international competitiveness. At the same time, a fuel tax will be levied on the imported products. Ideally, this tax should be based on imports' real fuel content but, where it is not known, imports will be taxed to the same extent as homogeneous products that are domestically produced by the predominant production method.
FACT is similar to a duty on fuel purchases with border tax adjustments. Both of them aim to level the playing field between domestic and foreign firms, trying to convert origin-based fuel prices to consumptionbased prices and limiting competitive disadvantages for the imposing Cristina Brandimarte -9781786431196 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/31/2019 07:18:16AM via free access country. But important differences lie between the two. First of all, FACT is imposed not only on fuel goods but also on non-fuel goods, according to their fuel content. In other words, it is levied on all goods that are domestically consumed, wherever they are produced. 19 Second, the FACT burden falls directly and entirely on domestic final consumers and does not affect prices of intermediate products, limiting negative effects on competitiveness. Further, FACT reduces incentives for tax evasion and provides incentives for exporting countries to adopt their own carbon prices, especially if it involves the refunding of CO 2 taxes already paid abroad on imported goods. Last but not least, there are stronger arguments in favour of FACT's compliance with WTO rules, as it can be considered as a VAT with flexible rates, where rates vary in order to reflect fossil fuel content following production improvements and technological progress.
UPSTREAM VS DOWNSTREAM FUEL TAXATION
Major differences between the FACT and the FCT are related to tax bases and price effects. We may analyse these differences starting from the following equation, expressing a country's fossil fuels budget:
where: FC 5 total final fuel consumption; FE 5 total fuel domestic extraction; FM 5 total fuel imports; FX 5 total fuel exports. Each addendum in expression (1.1) is referred to the total fuel and may be disaggregated into fuel and non-fuel products as follows:
where: The tax base's difference (bold addenda) depends on the trade balance of fuel embodied in non-fuels products. As developing countries, located in the middle of the carbon supply chain, have a negative balance, in those countries FCT's tax base is larger than FACT's tax base. The opposite happens in developed countries. With regard to short-term impacts on prices, these are shown in Table 1.1. FCT affects the firm's purchase price of fuel and then has the effect of increasing production prices and export prices. Consumption prices are affected directly by the tax levied on final consumption of fossil fuels and indirectly through the translation of production price increases.
FACT has no effect on production prices or on export prices. Consumer prices are directly affected through two channels: the tax levied on final consumption of fossil fuels and the tax levied on fuel embodied in non-fuel products consumed by final consumers.
Empirical Evaluation for Italy
In this section empirical evaluations for Italy are presented. Macroeconomic effects of both FCT and FACT have been simulated over a four-year time horizon using the ISTAT (Italian National Institute of Statistics) macroeconometric model (MEMo-It). 20, 21 Fiscal measures amount to 1 percentage point of GDP in the ex ante evaluation 22 for FCT and tax rates are set equal in the two simulations. The ex post macroeconomic effects 23 are evaluated with respect to a baseline scenario based on the May 2014 ISTAT official forecast. 
Dashes signal no effect. XX indicates a much stronger effect than X.
Simulation exercises are based on the following hypotheses:
• The country is small and belongs to a single monetary area. That means that nominal interest rates and nominal exchange rates remain unchanged with respect to baseline.
• Wages are indexed to consumer prices.
• Income taxation is progressive but income brackets are indexed, so that a fiscal drag does not occur.
• Entrepreneurs do not expect significantly restrictive effects on domestic demand or on competitive position and react to the lower real interest rates and the introduction of fuel tax, increasing investments.
• Fuel intensity of goods and services is assumed to be the same, on average, for imported, exported and domestically produced goods.
Results are shown in Table 1 .2.
In the first exercise the introduction of the FCT (duty on fossil fuel purchases) is simulated. 24 Results indicate that two periods can be distinguished: the first two years are characterized by a slightly positive effect while in the following two years a depressive effect on the economy occurs. In the first period, restrictive effects come from the reduction of households' real disposable income and are offset by expansive effects coming from terms of trade gains 25 and from the real interest rate reduction. Moreover, negative effects on exports are limited by low (estimated) elasticities of both the export deflator to changes in fuel prices and foreign demand of Italian products to export deflator. In the second period, the effects of higher inflation on production costs, in particular on indexed labour costs, result in a significant loss of competitiveness, which is mainly reflected in an increase in imports, since consumption of domestic goods is reduced in favour of cheaper imported ones.
In the second exercise the introduction of a FACT is simulated. Some relevant differences with respect to FCT simulation are evident. In the first period, inflation is higher and reduction of households' real disposable income is stronger, but they are associated with a stronger reduction in imports, as the tax is levied not only on fuels, as in the case of FCT, but also on non-fuel imported goods. Exports remain unchanged, as in the FCT simulation. As a result, expansive effects on GDP are stronger. In the second period, exports are not hit and imports continue to shrink. No carbon leakage effect occurs and investment and GDP growth are still positive. Higher real economic growth and higher inflation exert positive effects on public budget balance and on households' disposable income.
CONCLUSIONS
Empirical results indicate that in Italy, a small country belonging to a monetary area that is a net importer of fossil fuels, the implementation of a FACT should be more effective and less costly with respect to a tax on fuel purchases. Without competiveness losses, benefits coming from terms of trade gains and the stimulus to invest in new, fuel-saving technologies can be fully exploited, with positive effects on both the economy and the environment. Public finance conditions improve too, and resources then become available to strengthen efforts to reduce CO 2 atmospheric concentration, for example enhancing carbon sink ecosystems. A further simulation, not shown here, indicates that recycling revenues to promote sustainable development, for example, boosting forest management and linked economic activities, should help to reach multiple environmental and socioeconomic targets without worsening public finance.
APPENDIX
In this Appendix the methodology used to simulate fuel-added carbon tax (FACT) with the ISTAT macroeconometric model is explained. The approach followed is to consider differences from the tax on fuel purchases (FCT), already modelled in MEMo-It, and to accordingly amend the relevant equations. FACT differs from FCT in two respects: effects on consumer prices and effects on revenues.
Effects on prices Differential effects on prices are modelled considering the FACT's additional effect on consumer deflator growth with respect to FCT and to baseline. This additional effect reflects the tax on fuel embodied in non-fuel goods. 1 It is calculated assuming that fuel intensity is the same, on average, for imported, exported and domestically produced goods.
Effects on revenues To estimate revenues from FACT, we face the problem of calculating the tax base. FACT's tax base differs from FCT's tax base by the balance between fuel embodied in non-fuel exported and imported goods. These variables are expressed in the model in nominal and real terms, but not in quantity (barrels) of fuel content, as required to estimate revenues. We need a conversion factor to transform variables expressed in real terms to variables expressed in barrels of embodied fuel, the same unit as the FCT's tax base.
This conversion factor (gamma) is estimated by combining the following two different ways to calculate FACT's revenues: in differential terms with respect to FCT revenues; multiplying the tax rate times total fuel final consumption expressed in barrels. Formally:
FACT 5 FCT − t * I * (X − Mnf) (A1.1)
FACT 5 t * CFf * gamma 1 t * I * CFnf (A1.2)
where: FACT indicates revenues from the fuel-added tax; FCT indicates revenues from the tax on fuel purchases, where FCT 5 t * FUEL and FUEL indicates total fuel goods (barrels) that are domestically purchased, both by firms and final consumers; t is the tax rate (applied to fuel barrels); I indicates fuel intensity of goods: it is assumed to be the same, on average, for imported, exported and domestically produced goods and services; X indicates total exports (volume); Mnf indicates imports of non-fuel goods;
